Subject: Re: Apple IIx
Message-ID: <377EA0A8.73A21585@swbell.net>
From: Rubywand <rubywand@swbell.net>
Reply-To: rubywand@swbell.net
X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.6 [en] (Win95; U)
X-Accept-Language: en
MIME-Version: 1.0
Newsgroups: comp.sys.apple2
References: <377C80C7.4408E0B@swbell.net> 
<19990702060240.09630.00005160@ng-fg1.aol.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Lines: 255
Date: Sat, 03 Jul 1999 18:45:44 -0500
NNTP-Posting-Host: 207.193.12.151
X-Complaints-To: abuse@swbell.net
X-Trace: typhoon01.swbell.net 931045554 207.193.12.151 
(Sat, 03 Jul 1999 16:45:54 PDT)
NNTP-Posting-Date: Sat, 03 Jul 1999 16:45:54 PDT
Organization: SBC Internet Services

Supertimer writes ...
> 
> Rubywand <rubywand@swbell.net> wrote:
> 
> >Forrest writes ...
> >>
> >> Rubywand wrote:
> >>
> >> >As you say, the Apple II and its user base was still in good shape
> >> >in 1984. Even so, the II series certainly was not "hot".
> >>
 ....
> 
> Well, again if 8-bit compatibility were not an issue,

     Compatibility (8-bit, 65xxx, old-software, etc.) is always an issue,
always a consideration. It is not the only consideration.



> I submit that based
> on your definition, the Mac and the Apple II are the same.  Thus, if
> the Mac had a high-res mouse and windows interface, those features
> were "our" features!

     They could have been. Apple, itself, set up the barriers which blocked
II user movement to Mac:

1. The Mac violated a prime directive of personal computer design-- it was a
closed box without expansion Slots. An argument can be made for this
approach; but, that's part of the problem-- i.e. you provoke an argument
because you start by violating an established Article of Faith going back to
the early beginnings of small computing.

2. The Mac lacked color. This, in fact, was the clincher. No user of a color
computer was going to downgrade to a no-color machine.

3. Apple never intended that II users should view Mac as the continuation of
the II series-- for sure, Mac was not presented this way. 

This is where you can begin to see the fatal flaw in Apple's strategy. It
could not point II users to Mac without harming IIe sales. At the same time,
Mac was specifically positioned as _not_ an Apple II, by which Apple meant
"not a game machine toy". Linking it to the II would have damaged it's appeal
to the new user yuppie types at whom it was targeted.

Later, when Apple released other Macs with color, they were still stuck with
the problem of how to soak business users big time for their high-end
machines while convincing II users to 'go Mac'. Every attempt to lure II
users with lower priced, lower performance Macs flopped. (Had Apple released
a lower priced _higher_ performance Mac for II users, it's business buyers
may have questioned the value of their high-priced Macs.)

     Anyway, getting back to your idea of the first Mac being "our Mac" ...
If it had offered color and if it had been presented as "the next Apple II",
then, yes, despite lacking Slots and every sort of compatibility, it very
possibly would have been accepted by most performance-hungry II users.

     Cetainly, had Apple begun with the idea of moving II users to Mac in
1984 or 1985, features like color, a few Slots for memory expansion, Sound,
and a IIe card, plus a ready-to-go add-on hard disk, a BASIC, and a II-Mac
nameplate could have been included to virtually guarantee success.



> 
> But you are running around the argument.

     If this refers to setting the start for IIgs planning at no earlier than
mid-1984, the idea was to be realistic vis-a-vis what we had to work with in
Apple, Inc. leadership. That is, you forget about Vision and wait for more
direct motivators, like sock-in-the-gut Impending Doom.


> If Apple IIs still outsold PCs
> in 1984, when IIc feaver was hitting ("Apple II Forever"), Apple should
> have seized the moment and instead of releasing an incompatible Mac,
> released a "Mac IIGS" capable of running 8-bit software.  Compatibility
> was a must issue.  If the Mac had 8-bit compatibility, then those
> features would truly be our features.

     Of course. But, since we're playing "What If Apple Leadership Had
Vision?", why limit ourselves to a 1982-->1984 planning frame.

     The 16-bit, 1MB 8086 was available in 1976. Other 16-bit uP's arrived
about the same time. By the middle of 1980, Apple had everything it needed in
terms of both information about trends and monetary resources to begin
arranging for a 16-bit 4MHz 65xxx for the next Apple II.

     We arrive at the pre-Christmas 'show your stuff' time in 1982 and Apple
unveils the 65xxx-based 256k RAM (expandable to 8MB) color "II-Mac" with
super-res display, mouse, built-in 5.25" disk controller, Game Port, Apple
Instrumentation Interface socket, 6-voice MockingBoard style sound, and
optional 10MB hard disk.

     Slots were a strong selling point; so, II-Mac has 8 II-Mac Slots and a
Slot for the 'soon to be released' "II+ card". Since this thing has been
planned-for, there is a II-Mac Applesoft, a few II-Mac games, a few edu
programs, a II-Mac Appleworks, and a II-Mac PaintWorks. Also, there is
ProDOS.

     II-Mac meets most of the core 'requirements' of early 1980's II users.
Since you need to keep costs down and maximize performance, it is not old-II
compatible. However, there is that Slot for the II+ card and the 65816
processor which can run 8-bit 6502 code. II-Mac Applesoft BASIC is a
super-set of old Applesoft; and, you can plug in 5.25" drives and boot DOS
3.3 and ProDOS diskettes.
     
     Apple may have released a slightly enhanced II+-- built-in 64k, full
upper/lower case support-- in 1981 to keep sales going. But, there was, of
course, never a 128k IIe. For sure, there was no double-hires. Such features
would complicate design of your plug-in "II+ Card".


 
> >     You talk about 800,000 sales in 1984-- so what? How did this make
> >our machines faster or increase graphics resolution? Remember, with the
> >possible exception of double-hires, the Apple II series had not changed
> >in any major way since the II+. We still had the best game machine and 
> >plenty of new software; but, we were acutely aware of falling ever 
> >farther behind the leading edge.
> 
> It showed the user base was strong.  The way to keep it was to build
> a sound and graphics demon, BUT it had to be backward compatible.
> At least the first model had to be.
> 
> Not even IBM could push the user base from the importance of
> compatibility.  Remember Microchannel Architecture in the PS/2
> and how it ultimately failed?  It failed because the slots were not
> compatible and IBM did not provide a transition to the new
> architecture.  MCA was more advanced that the original PC
> architecture too, but that in itself was not enough.  The user base
> rebelled.

     By micro-channel, IBM had already lost control of PC design and of the
PC user base. IBM PC users, those who were really _IBM_ PC users, could rebel
because there was some place they could easily rebel to. In fact, clone
prices were lower and performance was better.

     The situation with II users in 1984-1985 was entirely different. We were
quite literally committed to the II series and had a large, active support
structure of users groups, publications, hardware makers, and software
producers. And, by 1985, the "IIx" rumors were flying-- another reason to
stick with the II.

     Then, too, practically speaking, there was no place to go. There was
nothing like PC clone activity going on in II-ville. The PC was impossible
for IBM to protect. Far too little of the machine is on the motherboard for
anyone to exercise proprietary rights. Apple II is much different. Apple II
cloners were always in for a fight-- battles which they routinely lost-- and
they knew it.



> 
> In the Apple world, graphics and sound would not be enough
> either without some sort of transition platform that was at least
> compatible with the old world in its initial model.

     So, mainly to avoid hassle, we have the "II+ Card".


 
> Previously, I wrote about how even though the Amiga 2000 had PC
> killing sound and graphics in late 1988 and that it could actually
> do the work of SGI workstations for the production of Babylon 5,
> such features alone, no matter how superior to PCs, would not of
> and in themselves win against the PC.

     True. Besides, by 1988, it was way too late for an Amiga 2000. The Amiga
base was too small and the PC user base was very large and expanding. The
Amiga 2000 was 'another model'; the PC was a constantly developing platform
which promised ever better graphics and, in 1989, ever better sound. 

     Commodore never produced a 'IIgs' for its C-64/128 users. It went to
Amiga-- a machine different from the C-64/128 in every possible way,
including _price_. The later, cheaper 500 versions sold moderately well; but,
they lacked the appeal of being the current top-of-the-line. If Commodore was
determined to go the 68xxx route, it should have introduced the cheapo '500
first back in 1985.

     Apple had something Commodore-Amiga never had, a user base committed to
a computer series and willing to spend big bucks. And, unlike Commodore,
Apple had the good luck of being forced to upgrade its low-end machine in
1986. Even as late as 1989 (possibly, 1990), Apple always had the option of
going to a large II series user base with a new II to battle PC.


> 
> As for the IIGS, yes, new more powerful models could have
> been made and where the Amiga 2000 failed, a "IIGS 2000"
> would probably have succeeded precisely because the users
> had their transition.  But advanced IIGS were not built, not
> because advanced features and transitioning users conflicted,
> but rather because Apple didn't want to build one to compete
> against the mac.

     Probably true.


 ....
> 
> The initial Mac was a failure and did not improve until Jobs was removed
> so that the system could be freed from his vision.  The IIc was a raging
> success and even after all these years, it was an unqualified success.
> The IIGS was a success too, but Apple killed it by cutting advertising and
> R&D.

    "_Cutting_ advertising"?  What advertising?!



> Otherwise, the II users would have continued to march forward
> in force to the current day as an integrated user base.  I submit that the
> features would have increased with each new model, just as Amiga
> features increased.

     Amiga = Orphan Bait = Dead Duck.

     Really, there is no argument that the strategy you outline for the II
series could have been successful-- most likely, would have been.


> 
> >     Translation: Tricks are for kids; you're going to have to battle PC
> >head-on. No major computer maker, including IBM, wanted to face the
> >prospect of matching rapidly developing PC clone features and cutthroat
> >pricing.
> 
> I submit that the Amiga 2000 fills the criterea.  I don't remember how it
> was priced, but I think the price actually went DOWN compared to the
> Amiga 1000.  More than that, this was the computer that put the PC
> of its day to shame.  Better sound and graphics.  You could generate
> Babylon 5 CG on it!  They actually used it as a low cost substitute for
> SGI machins.
> 
> So, kick butt graphics and features, hard drive and all, 1988.  The
> Amiga 2000 had a mission to demolish the PC market by the sheer
> force of features.
> 
> In the words of the Babylon 5 intro, "it failed."

     Yes; as was expected by most II users and most computer shoppers of the
time.

     By 1988, an Amiga would have had to deliver extraordinary superiority to
PC at a lower price. That wasn't going to happen.

     The only major computer maker with the user base to take on PC in 1988
was Apple; and, they blew it.

Rubywand